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PART I1: PROCEDURAL LAW
EVIDENCE
by
Frank W. Elliott*

D

URING the year under review the cases of greatest significance for
those who seek to remain abreast of current developments were those
dealing with impeachment by prior conviction, presumptions, and hearsay
evidence.
I. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION

The problem of the admission of prior convictions for impeachment of
testimony in subsequent suits was dealt with by the supreme court in
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Landry.! On February 4, 1964, Robert Landry pleaded guilty to charges of theft of postal money orders and the forgery of
the payee's endorsements thereon. He was sentenced to confinement for
three years and assessed a fine of $100. The sentence was suspended and
he was placed on actively supervised probation, but he did pay the fine.
About a year later, on the recommendation of his probation officer, the
actively supervised probation was terminated.
On September 4, 1968, Landry filed a workmen's compensation suit,
alleging that he had injured his back on May 28, 1968, while lifting a
spandall onto a barge. Trial was held on March 4, 1969. The testimony
on behalf of Landry was his own and that of a medical expert who based
his opinion, in part, on Landry's statements to him. Defendant offered
proof of the conviction as impeachment of Landry's testimony, but the
trial judge refused to admit it. Judgment was rendered on a jury verdict
of total and permanent incapacity.'
In the court of civil appeals there was no real dispute between the
parties over many of the requirements for the admission of evidence of
prior convictions for impeachment purposes. It was conceded that the
conviction involved moral turpitude, and that it was properly offered
during cross-examination of the plaintiff. The gist of the dispute was
simply the remoteness vel non of the conviction. Landry contended that
the trial court's action was not an abuse of discretion "since the conviction was too remote in time to affect the plaintiff's credibility. ' The court
of civil appeals agreed that the question of remoteness was one largely
within the discretion of the trial judge, but disagreed on the issue of abuse.
The court cited several cases for the proposition that if the conviction
antedates the trial by more than ten years, it is too remote.' It also dis*B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1970).
aTravelers Ins. Co. v. Landry, 448 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
3Id. at 232.
4Id.
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cussed rule 6-09 (b) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,' which
generally agrees with the ten-year limitation. After a review of other Texas
decisions,' which showed that the shortest period for which the evidence
was excluded was nine years, it held that the trial judge had abused his
discretion, and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Reversing this decision, the supreme court adopted the standard that
"the conviction must have been 'sufficiently recent in time to have some
bearing on the present credibility of the witness.' " Disagreeing with defendant's contention that earlier cases had adopted a rigid policy of admissibility for convictions of less than eight to ten years prior to the civil
trial, it approved the language in Dallas County Water Control & Improvement District v. Ingram:
From a review of both civil and criminal cases it would appear that civil
courts have generally held that such a matter depends upon circumstances
presented and that the question should usually be left to the discretion of
the trial judge. In exercising his discretion the trial judge has an opportunity
to consider and weigh all the facts and circumstances in that particular case.
Only for the abuse of discretion is it held that such testimony may call for
a reversal.'

The court pointed out that there were some cases in which the conviction
was so remote as to make the evidence inadmissible as a matter of law.
On the other hand, there might be cases in which the conviction was so
recent that it would be admissible as a matter of law. But for a case between the two extremes, the matter should be left to the trial court's discretion. The timing of Landry's conviction fell between the extremes,
and the trial court having considered all of the circumstances, it should
not be reversed.
The court of civil appeals noted that "[c]ounsel have not cited to us
a case wherein a conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude so recent in point of time to the trial as here-slightly more than five yearshas been excluded. Our independent research has not located such
authority."' That notation appears to be accurate, but it is suggested that
the search was directed toward an incorrect goal. Of sixteen cases examined,
only one found that the trial judge had abused his discretion in refusing
to admit evidence of the prior conviction," and although the dates cannot
be determined precisely, it is clear that the conviction was less than two
*Committee on Rules and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates,
46 F.R.D. 161, 296 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence].
0448 S.W.2d at 233-34.
"Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1970).
8 395 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956). See also Dallas County Water Control
& Improvement Dist. v. Ingram, 425 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
9448 S.W.2d at 233.

"Kennedy v. International-Great N. Ry., 1 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928), judgment
adopted. The conviction was June 19, 1925, and the decision in the court of appeals was dated
May 19, 1927. International-Great N. Ry. v. Kennedy, 296 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1927), aff'd, I S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928), judgment adopted. Although the
date of the civil trial is not given, it is obvious that less than 2 years was involved. In addition,
it is shown that the conviction took place between the date of the occurrence giving rise to the
civil trial and the trial itself.
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years old at the time of the trial. On the other hand, four cases have held
that there was abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence." Nine cases
held that there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the evidence, 2
while only two held that there was no abuse in admitting the evidence."
This review indicates that the Texas courts have apparently followed
the dictum of Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dunn, that "[s]ome courts even go
farther and say that in a case where there is any doubt of the propriety in
admitting the evidence of the conviction, the trial court should exclude
it. ' ' 4 In other words, the discretion of the trial court should be weighted
toward exclusion when remoteness is in question.
Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 6-09 (b), discussed by the court of
civil appeals, provides: "(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under
this rule is inadmissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since
the date of the release of the witness from confinement, or the expiration
of the period of his parole, probation, or sentence, whichever is the later
date."" This rule raises two questions with respect to the Texas practice.
First, the meaning of the flat ten-year limitation itself, and second, the
dates from which the time is to be calculated.
It is suggested that the ten-year limitation would not be inconsistent
with the result reached by the supreme court in Landry. As the court
recognized, there may be cases in which the conviction is too remote as a
matter of law." The ten-year limitation of the federal rule could be taken
as the outside limit of admissibility, that is, any conviction older than
ten years is too remote as a matter of law. The federal rule does not say
that a nine-year-old conviction would be admissible, it only considers
directly those older than ten. It is not probable that the proposed rule
would be construed to remove the discretion of the judge in other cases.
The federal rule measures the ten-year period from the completion of
sentence, probation, parole, etc. At least some of the Texas criminal cases
seem to use this approach also.17 However, the civil cases seem to assume
"' Dallas County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Ingram, 395 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965), error ref. n.r.e. (28 years); Bunch v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 209
S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948) (14 years); Miller v. Brand, 32 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930) (30 years); Bernard's Inc. v. Austin, 300 S.W. 256 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1927), error ref. (14 years).
12Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Miller, 426 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968)
(9
years); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buffington, 400 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966), error
ref. n.r.e. (7 years plus no moral turpitude); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 383 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1964), error ref. n.r.e. (9 years); United Benefit Fire Ins. Co. v. Stock, 344
S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961) (9-10 years); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Yother,
306 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957), error ref. n.r.e. (22 years); Transport Ins.
Co. v. Cossaboon, 291 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1956), error ref. n.r.e. (15 years);
Pool v. Sneed, 173 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943), error ref. w.o.m. (20 years);
Carr v. DeWitt, 171 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943), error ref. w.o.m. (10 years);
Texas Motor Coaches v. Palmer, 97 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, this holding approved, 132 Tex. 77, 121 S.W.2d 323 (1938) (19 years).
"aAdams v. State Bd. of Ins., 319 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958), error ref.
n.r.e. (8 years); York v. Glenn, 242 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951) (8 years).
14383 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1964), error ref. n.r.e.
5
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 6-09(b), 46 F.R.D. 161, 296 (1969).
'"458 S.W.2d at 651. The court cites cases involving times of 28, 22, 14 and 14 years.
7
" See, e.g., Couch v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 292, 255 S.W.2d 223 (1953); Toms v. State, 150
Tex. Crim. 264, 200 S.W.2d 174 (1947).
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that the time is measured from the date of conviction;"9 the only case to
9 so held.
directly meet the question, Bernard's Inc. v. Austin,"
There the
conviction was fourteen years old at the time of the civil trial. The
appellee contended that time in the penitentiary should not be taken into
account, because it would be unreasonable to assume that reformation had
come about during the period of incarceration. The court disagreed, citing
reformation as one of the purposes of punishment, saying "[w]e think
the logic of the situation rather impels one to the conclusion that the infliction of punishment carries with it the presumption-disputable, it is
true-that through the punishment inflicted on one for the commission
of a crime that reformation during the period that punishment was being
inflicted was set in motion by and continued throughout the punishment
as result thereof."' The use of the federal measuring device in the instant
case might well call for a different result, since the expiration of the suspended sentence occurred only two years before the civil trial. However,
the logic of the quotation above seems valid, and the implicit acceptance
of the date of conviction as the start of the time period by later cases lends
weight to the conclusion that the Texas civil approach is contrary to that
proposed by the federal rule.
It thus appears that the state of the law in Texas civil cases is this: If
the conviction antedates the civil trial by ten years or more, it is likely
to be held inadmissible as a matter of law. If only a two- or three-year
period is involved, and there is no evidence of rehabilitation or reformation,
it is likely to be admissible as a matter of law. However, the cases falling
between the two extremes will be dependent on the exercise of discretion by
the trial judge. His decision on admissibility will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of severe abuse, and is less likely to be disturbed if
the decision is to exclude, rather than to admit.
II. PRESUMPTIONS

The availability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff in
a plea of privilege hearing was the subject of Southwestern Transfer Co.
v. Slay."' B. H. Slay was proceeding south in his automobile along a fourlane divided highway in San Jacinto County. As he was nearing a railroad
underpass, a truck belonging to Southwestern Transfer Company was
nearing the same underpass from the opposite direction. Suddenly, there
appeared to be an explosion, and a fork-lift machine being transported
upon the truck was thrown to the road behind the truck, bounced, hit the
esplanade, bounced again, and landed in Slay's lane. In attempting to
avoid the machine, Slay swerved to his left across the esplanade, and was
struck by a piece of flying debris, either from the truck or the machine.
In his suit in San Jacinto County against the Transfer Company, Slay
" See Adams v. State Bd. of Ins., 319 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958), error ref.

n.r.e. The claim by the party witness was that the time interval should start from the commission
of the offense rather than from the date of conviction.
'9300 S.W. 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927), error ref.
2

0id.

at 259.

21455 S.W.2d

352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont

1970).
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gave notice of intent to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.' The
transfer company filed a plea of privilege to be sued in El Paso County.
The controverting affidavit relied, inter alia, on subdivision 23 of article
1995."'
Through pre-trial procedures it was established that the driver of the
truck was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the
event, and that the defendant was a corporation. The trial of the plea of
privilege was to the court and only the plaintiff gave evidence. He established a case for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and
the trial court overruled the plea of privilege. The court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not available
to a plaintiff on a plea of privilege hearing.
The basis of decision seems to be that res ipsa only establishes a prima
facie right to recover, and that more than that is necessary to establish
venue. The court quotes from Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc. v.
Community Inns of America, Inc.: "It is not sufficient under this Exception [No. 23] to show merely a prima facie case or merely to introduce
enough evidence to raise an issue-the plaintiff must establish by a preponderence of the evidence that he has a 'cause of action' as alleged." '
The court goes on to say that the filing of the plea of privilege created a
prima facie right to transfer until the plaintiff overcame it by pleading
and proof. By use of res ipsa, the plaintiff only proved a prima facie cause
of action, and "in the case of an equal doubt between the right to the
transfer and the exception, [the court must] resolve the doubt in favor
of the transfer." 2'
Judge Stephenson, dissenting, pointed out that the position that the
plaintiff must establish more than a prima facie cause of action is applicable only when the defendant has rebutted the plaintiff's evidence. He
found that Compton v. Elliott,"' relied on by many later cases for the
proposition advanced by the majority, was decided in the context of a
contention by plaintiff that evidence offered by defendant should be disregarded. The supreme court denied that contention, stating that the
"plaintiff must prove the facts in the usual way, which means that the
defendant is to be permitted by his evidence to dispute and contradict
plaintiff's evidence .... On the hearing of the plea of privilege, the issue

made is tried in the ordinary way and the truth as to the fact or facts in
22There seemed to be no real dispute about the applicability of the doctrine under the facts

of the case.
'TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 23 (1964).
24 389 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965).
25
5 S.W.2d at 356. At this point, the court refers by way of footnote to the principle enunciated in I C. McCoRMiCm & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 54 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK & RAY] that when two presumptions conflict, the one which rests upon the

stronger and weightier reasons should prevail. It

is suggested that

this principle

applies to the

conflict of two evidentiary presumptions and has no effect on situations such as the one posed
by the case at bar. The prima facie right to transfer is simply a rule for placing the burden of
producing evidence in the trial on plea of privilege.
26126 Tex. 232, 88 S.W.2d 91 (1935).
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issue is ascertained by the introduction and weighing of evidence offered
by both parties.""
If this approach is followed, then when the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, and the defendant does not choose to rebut that case, the factfinder is justified in finding the facts to be as the plaintiff has shown.
Since there was no rebuttal in the case at bar, the trial judge was justified
in finding as a fact that the defendant breached a duty to plaintiff in the
county of suit, giving rise to a cause of action.
The court recognized that if the plaintiff had established facts giving
rise to a "true presumption," and those facts were not rebutted by defendant, then the trial court would have been compelled to overrule the
plea of privilege.' Res ipsa, it is recognized, is not a "true presumption. ' ' "
However, it can be categorized as what Dean McCormick called a "permissive presumption, '"" i.e., the plaintiff has established facts which are
sufficient to permit, but not to compel, a finding of the later fact, negligence. The court seems to recognize that if the same facts were proved
by plaintiff at the trial on the merits and were not rebutted in any manner
by defendant, then the fact-finder would be justified in finding negligence
by the defendant."' Since this is so, it seems incongruous to say that this
proof, "in the usual way," is insufficient to support the same fact finding
at the plea of privilege hearing. At its worst aspect from the plaintiff's
viewpoint, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur represents a judicial policy
decision that certain facts will be considered circumstantial evidence sufficient to reach the fact-finder on the issue of negligence.' Suppose the
plaintiff had offered circumstantial evidence of some specific act of negligence on the part of the defendant, which was not rebutted. The court
would certainly not say in such a situation that evidence of the plaintiff's
right to venue in the county of suit was not sufficient to go to the f actfinder just because the plaintiff had not established the proposition as a
matter of law.
It may well be that the appellate court might decide that the evidence
is insufficient to support the finding of fact of negligence, but here the
court did not do this. It decided, in effect, that there was no evidence of
negligence." The fact of the event itself does not give rise to an inference
of negligence, it is true, but when the facts necessary for the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur are shown, more than the fact of the event is present.
The court pointed out that this was a case of first impression, and the
presence of the dissent gave jurisdiction to the supreme court to determine
27 Id.

at 240-41, 88 S.W.2d at 94-96.

28455 S.W.2d at 357-58. The example given is that of the "branded vehicle."
29 Id.
"sC. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §5 308-09 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]; McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REV. 291, 297 (1927). See also
MCCORMICK & RAY
1

5

51.

" See Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TEXAs L. REV. 761, 774 (1948).
'See Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 257, 258 (1948).
' The case was remanded for a new trial only because the evidence was not fully developed.
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the question involved." It is unfortunate that this course was not pursued,
since the dissenting position seems much more reasonable."
III.

HEARSAY

The admissibility of a physician's testimony concerning information
related to him during an examination of the decedent was dealt with in
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith." Elton Smith was a pumper for Gulf Oil
Corporation. His duties included lifting various containers of chemicals
and occasionally moving pumps. On March 27th, Smith left home for
work around 6:45 a.m., was seen at a cafe having coffee at 6:50 a.m.,
left the cafe at 7:10 a.m. in his pickup containing supplies, and was seen
at 9:00 a.m. going into a Gulf lease where there were wells to be treated.
He was next seen by his wife at 10:00 a.m., appearing nervous, upset, and
in pain. He went immediately to a Doctor Howard's office where he told
the doctor that "he had been working on the job and was manipulating
some equipment, and had this sudden onset of severe pains and he came
home and directly to the doctor's office." 7 The doctor examined him and
administered a narcotic and a tranquilizing drug. An electrocardiogram
showed no apparent acute heart damage, but his blood pressure was high.
Later that afternoon he died of an acute myocardial infarction. The doctor
testified that in his opinion the damage to the heart occurred just prior to
Smith's coming into the office on March 27th; that the stress or strain of
moving the equipment brought it about; that if Smith had lifted a can
of chemical it could have caused the attack. Smith had been treated for
several years for complaints of high blood pressure and questionable heart
trouble, but until March 27th there had never been found any definite
evidence of any specific disease process within the heart.
The defendant objected to the relation by the doctor of the history
given him by Smith on the grounds of hearsay, but the objection was
overruled. On appeal the court of civil appeals first considered the exception to the hearsay rule based on statements made to a treating physician.
The court held that the history was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose
of explaining the basis of the doctor's opinion, but was not admissible to
prove the truth of the history." Since the non-hearsay use gave no help
to the plaintiff, the court then considered another possible exception, that
of excited utterances or "res gestae."
S.W.2d at 358 n.9.
'There
is no record of an application for writ of error being filed, and in fact, it appears
that no motion for rehearing in the court of civil appeals was sought. The Amarillo court of appeals reached a different result in Bearden v. Lyntegar Elec. Coop., Inc., 454 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970). That case involved an application of TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1995, § 9a (1964), and the court squarely held that res ipsa loquitur was available in order
to establish venue. The text indicates this author's preference for the result reached by the Amarillo court.
"448 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
7id.
at 542-43.
"Id. at 543-44. See also McCoRMICK & RAY §§ 842-43. The evidence would have been admissible to a certain extent under Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 8-03 (b) (4), 46 F.R.D. 161,
345-46 (1969). See Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 355 (1969). The only exclusion
would have been "on the job."
34455
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Based on the precedent of Truck Insurance Exchange v. Michling" and
Hartford Accident &qIndemnity Co. v. Hale,' the court held the evidence
inadmissible since, as in Michling, there was no "independent proof that
the deceased suffered any injury at approximately the time and place
alleged, and the only evidence of the occurrence is the hearsay statement,
the proof is attempting to lift itself by its own bootstraps." 1
Judge Preslar dissented on two grounds. First, the basic policy question involving the lone worker, since the defendant is in a much better
position if death ensues than if only an injury is present. In the latter
situation, the testimony of the worker would be sufficient to satisfy the
evidence requirements lacking in the present case. Second, even accepting
the rationale of the Texas precedents, there was independent evidence of
the occurrence under the facts of the case. It is submitted that the dissent
is correct on one or both of the points, and they will be discussed in
reverse order.
It is the position of the dissent that the startling occurrence was the
heart attack. There was evidence other than his own out-of-court statement that he suffered a heart attack. Since that is true, and this occurrence
was "startling enough to produce his nervous excitement" then the utterance was "spontaneous and unreflecting when he told the doctor 'he had
come in from the job at which place he was working, and was manipulating some equipment and had this sudden onset of severe pains.' ""
In Michling the evidence that the employee had been injured on the
job consisted solely of the testimony of his wife that when he came home
" 'he sort of stumbled and caught himself and walked on up to the house
and he said his head was hurting him terribly; he was batting his eyes and
was very pale.'... [He said] 'he had hit his head on the bulldozer, the iron
bar across the seat. It slipped off the hill and he hit his head.' ... '[H]is
head hurt so bad that he couldn't do anything else but had to put up the
bulldozer and come home." "" There was no visible mark of any injury

upon his head. The medical testimony showed that Michling died of a
cerebral hemorrhage resulting from a congenital weakness in one of the
blood vessels in the brain, and that it could have been brought on by a
cough, a strain, a blow to the head or may have occurred spontaneously.
The distinction sought to be established is that in Michling there was no
other evidence at all of the injury. In Smith there was testimony that the
plaintiff had just suffered a heart attack. The problem with the distinction
at this stage is that in Michling there was evidence that he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, and it could be inferred that he was suffering from it
at the time he made the statement.
The evidence in Hale consisted of testimony by a foreman that Hale
arrived at the company's office in work clothes, said he had been hurt,
and appeared in pain. The foreman had him remove his pants to see how
"364 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1963).
40400 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1966).
41 448 S.W.2d at 544.
42Id. at 547 (dissent).

"'Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. 1963).
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badly he was injured, and the examination revealed injuries to Hale's groin,
buttocks and lower ribs. Later examination by a doctor revealed a "pressing" or "crushing" type of injury from the lower rib cage to the crest
of the pelvis on the left side, with various other bruises, plus a broken rib.
Hale stated a few minutes after entering the office that he was injured "at
well No. 6 on the F. G. Perez lease; that the clutch was thrown on the
pumping unit and he set the brake and then pulled the plug and found
water in the crankcase; that to keep oil and water from getting on his
clothes, he put the plug back in and stepped back in the line of the counterbalancing weights and they came down and mashed him against the Aframe."" The problem with the distinction is even greater in Hale. There
was evidence of a crushing injury, just as there was evidence of heart attack
in Smith.
Although the attempted distinction is difficult to maintain, it is submitted that the dissent is correct in saying that the injury itself should be
considered as the exciting event. In Hale the court stated its rationale for
the Michling decision as "to be admissible as res gestae the statements must
be shown to have been a spontaneous reaction to an exciting event, and
the statements themselves cannot be used to prove the exciting event."
Although it is true that the descriptive portion of the statement would
not be admissible under the exception concerning statements to physicians
for the purpose of treatment, it is true for a special reason. The theory behind that exception is that a patient usually tells his doctor the truth
about those things the doctor needs to know in order to treat him properly.' The portion of the statement that the patient was manipulating
equipment and suffered chest pains would be admissible, but the addition
of "on the job" would not, since the doctor would not need to know
where the equipment was being manipulated. The basis for the excited
utterance exception is entirely different. The court in Michling quotes
from Wigmore to show the theory:
This general principle is based on the experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that
the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the
actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.
Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of selfinterest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the
utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking
the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor
of the speaker's belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore
be received as testimony to those facts."
If the statement "I had chest pains while manipulating equipment"
would be admissible for the above reasons, it boggles the mind to say that
"Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex. 1966).
4Id.
at 311.
"McCoKcIK & RAY §§ 842-43. See also note 2 supra.
476 J. WIGMO,, EVIDENCE S 1747 (3d ed. 1940).
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the addition of "on the job" would convert the statement into one "brought
fully to bear by reasoned reflection."
In both Michling and Hale there was evidence casting doubt on the
truth of the hearsay statements. In Michling it appeared that there was
no iron bar on the bulldozer seat, the time records of the employer showed
that Michling did not work on the day of his injury, and the vehicle records indicated that none of the bulldozers operated by the company were
in operation on that date. In Hale a later examination disclosed that the
pumping unit was not running, the brake was not set, and that the counter-balances were all the way down. There were no traces of clothing,
blood or skin. There were shoe prints at the unit, but not where Hale said
he had been. In Smith there was no evidence to dispute the plaintiff's statements in any manner.
The evidence disputing the occurrence of the event on the job would
surely be relevant to the issue of where the injury occurred, and might
be so overwhelming as to require a reversal of a jury decision to the contrary, but should not have a bearing on the admissibility of the hearsay
statement. However, if the various proven injuries were not the exciting
events, that is, if the exciting events were "injury on the job," then the
second distinction (disputing evidence) would have some bearing on admissibility. In such a case, the judge would have the preliminary fact
question to decide, "did an exciting event occur?"
Rule 1-04 (a) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
in making the determination of preliminary questions of the admissibility
of evidence, the judge "is not bound by the rules of evidence except claims
of privilege."" Therefore, the judge could consider the hearsay statement
as to the occurrence of the event in deciding whether the event did occur.
The evidence to the contrary would be relevant, and in fact, might lead
the judge to the conclusion that no such event had occurred. Since there
is no contrary evidence in Smith that decision would not be compelled,
and since "it is generally held that in passing upon the admissibility of a
statement offered as a part of the res gestae the trial court has considerable
discretion," it would be reasonable to uphold his decision to admit.'
The other basis of the dissent is applicable also if the exciting event involved in this type of case is injury on the job rather than just injury,
and the judge may not consider hearsay on the preliminary question of
admissibility. The dissent stated that there is
a basic weakness of the law in this area-where a man works alone and there
are no witnesses to the cause of death. A phase of this law is wrong, because
under it survivors of a man who works alone could have a perfect case,
and yet recovery be denied because there were no witnesses. For all practical
purposes under such circumstances, the man who works alone is denied

death benefits and the employer is wasting his money in premium payments
therefor. If the employee suffers an injury short of death, be it a broken
finger or a totally disabling heart attack, he can tell about it and recover
benefits.... Does it not come down to the trustworthiness of his account of
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his injuries? Is he more to be believed when seeking money benefits or when,
as here, he is seeking to stay alive? Compensation benefits are for injuries
received in the course of employment; the search here is for the truth of
whether there was injury on the job. We have been told that there was such
an injury by the man who suffered it. Under the circumstances by which the
story comes to us, is it worthy of belief? Standing uncontradicted, should it
be relied upon in a court of law as proof of the fact of injury?5"
Proposed federal evidence rule 8-03 (b) (2) provides that a "statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition,"'" is not
excluded by reason of the hearsay rule. The advisory committee's note for
this section states: "Whether proof of the startling event may be made by
the statement itself is largely an academic question, since in most cases
there is present at least circumstantial evidence that something of a startling nature must have occurred."'" The note then cites several cases in
which the evidence consists of the condition of the declarant," and goes
on to say: "Nevertheless, on occasion the only evidence may be the content of the statement itself, and rulings that it may be sufficient are described as 'increasing,' . . . and as the 'prevailing practice . . . .' " As
stated earlier," proposed federal rule 1-04 (a) provides that the judge is
not limited by the hearsay rule in passing upon preliminary questions of
fact, so there would be no problem at all about the admissibility of the
evidence in either Michling, Hale, or Smith under the federal practice.
It is suggested that one of the several possible approaches should be
adopted in order to admit testimony such as that offered in Smith. One,
the existence of the event should be considered as a preliminary question
of fact, and the judge should not be limited as to his consideration of hearsay evidence of that existence. Two, the injury should be considered as the
event, so that if the other requirements of the exception are met, the lone
worker would not be penalized. Three, a special rule should be adopted
applicable only in death cases in which there are no eyewitnesses, that
special rule being merely a relaxation of the principle established in
Michling for excited utterances generally."

"Id.at 545-46 (dissent).
"Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 8-03(b)(2), 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969).
52Id. at 352.
"Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869); Lampe v. United States, 229 F.2d
43 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Wetherbee v. Safety Cas. Co., 219 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1955); Wheeler v.
United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954). See also Jacobs
v. Village of Buhl, 199 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937); Thompson v. Conemaugh Iron Works,
114 Pa. Super. 247, 175 A. 45 (1934).
5446 F.R.D. 161, 353 (1969), citing MCCORMICK 272; Slough, Spontaneous Statements and
State of Mind, 46 IowA L. REV. 224, 246 (1961); and giving as illustrations
Armour & Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 78 Colo. 569, 243 P. 546 (1926); Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131
S.E. 735 (1926).
"See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.
" Adoption of either of the first two proposals would, as a practical matter, simply be the
adoption of the third, since if the worker is alive, or if there were witnesses, the problem is an

academic one.

